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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last thirty years, the influence of bioethics on public
institutions has grown. Bioethicists have served on national and state
government commissions, testified before Congress, written amicus
briefs for landmark legal cases, and testified as experts in the
courtroom.' Each of these developments has taken bioethics out of the
1. Experts have testified about bioethics issues in the following cases: Planned
Parenthood v. Verniero, 22 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (D.N.J. 1998) (ethics testimony
regarding partial birth abortion); Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1115-16 (D.
Neb. 1998) (ethics testimony regarding partial birth abortions); Andrade Garcia v.
Columbia Med. Ctr., 996 F. Supp. 617, 626 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (ethics testimony regarding
responsibilities of physicians, nurses, hospitals, and their employees); United States v.
Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1163 (E.D. La. 1995) (ethics testimony regarding standards
for referring HIV positive dental patients); Zenith Lab. Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652, 1656, 1664 (D.N.J. 1992) (ethics testimony regarding
standards in human subjects research), rev'd, 19 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (ethics testimony about
informed consent in abortion services), afyd in part & rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d
Cir. 199 1), and aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); DeGidio v. Pung, 704
F. Supp. 922, 957 (D. Minn. 1989) (ethics testimony regarding dual responsibilities of
physicians practicing institutional medicine), affid, 920 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1990);
Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1564 (N.D. ]1M. 1983) (ethics
testimony regarding standards of informed consent in research); American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 560 (Ct. App. 1994) (ethics testimony
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academy and into a new setting. While commentators support most of
these developments,2 they have expressed serious reservations about the
regarding decision to undergo abortion), rev'd, 912 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1996), vacated, 940
P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997); Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533-34 (Ct. App.
1988) (ethics testimony regarding conservator's duty and testimony regarding
physicians' rights and obligations when conscientiously objecting to withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223, 225 (Ct. App.
1984) (ethics testimony regarding standards for withdrawing ventilator support from
competent non-terminal patient); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Conn. 1972) (ethics
testimony regarding reasoning about child's organ donation); Breesmen v. Department
of Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Med., 567 So. 2d 469, 470-71- (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(ethics testimony regarding standards for documenting patient's refusal of tests and
treatment); Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1338 (111. 1990) (ethics testimony
regarding standards of consent and assent for minor's donation of bone marrow for
transplant); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1196-97 (11. 1990) (ethics
testimony regarding elective status of artificial nutrition and hydration); Neade v. Portes,
710 N.E.2d 418, 422 (11. App. Ct. 1999) (ethics testimony regarding disclosure of
physician's financial incentives to limit treatment); Sarka v. Rush Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Med. Ctr., 566 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ill. App. CL 1990) (ethics testimony regarding
standards of consent to treatment and appropriate risk/benefit ratio for medical
intervention); In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 42 (Ind. 1991) (ethics testimony regarding
practical and theoretical tasks of ethics); Herridge v. Board of Registration in Med., 648
N.E.2d 745, 747, 751 (Mass. 1995) (ethics testimony regarding psychopharmacologist-
patient sex); Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Mass. 1979)
(ethics testimony regarding standards for overriding refusal of dialysis by prisoner);
McKnight v. Midwest Eye Inst., Inc., 799 S.W.2d 909, 917-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)
(ethics testimony regarding appropriateness of preventing physicians from seeing
patients during contract dispute); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 126, 130
(Nev. 1998) (ethics testimony regarding standards for animal research); In re Jobes, 529
A.2d 434, 444 n.9 (N.J. 1987) (ethics testimony regarding distinction between
withdrawing nasogastric tubes and other kinds of life sustaining treatment); In re
Conroy, 457 A.2d 1232, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983) (ethics testimony
regarding benefit/burden calculation for forgoing medical treatment), rev'd, 464 A.2d
303 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), and rev'd, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Delio
v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 683 (App. Div. 1987) (ethics
testimony regarding distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment);
MacClements v. LaFone, 408 S.E.2d 878, 882 (N.C. CL App. 1991) (ethics testimony
regarding prohibition on psychologist-client sex); Mazza v. Huffaker, 300 S.E.2d 833,
842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (ethics testimony regarding sex between psychiatrist and
patient's spouse); Weiner v. State Med. Bd., No. 98AP-605, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS
5716, at *6 (Ct. App. 1998) (ethics testimony regarding standards in podiatry); Rogers v.
South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 377 S.E.2d 125, 126 (S.C. CL App. 1989) (ethics
testimony regarding psychologist's duty to warn potential victim of client); Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992) (ethics testimony regarding moral distinction
between embryo and preembryo).
2. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 103D CONG., BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS IN U.S. PUBLIC POLICY (1993) (reviewing involvement of bioethics in federal
policy making); Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Vacco v. Quill, 519 U.S. 1039 (1996) (No. 95-1858) (opposing assisted suicide); Brief
for Bioethicists for Privacy as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Webster v.
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presence of bioethics experts in the courtroom4
This Article addresses key questions about expert bioethics testimony4
from within the framework of the basic rule concerning expert
witnesses, Federal Rule of Evidence 702.' This Rule6 requires judges to
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605) (supporting abortion
rights); Dan W. Brock, Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in Policy-
Making, 97 ETHICS 786 (1987) (describing the work of the President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Research); R. Alto Chara, The Hunting of
the Snark: The Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-Lifers, and Third World Women,
STAN, L, & POL'Y REV., Spring 1995, at 11 (describing the work of the Human Embryo
Research Panel); James F. Childress, The National Bioethics Advisory Commission:
Bridging the Gaps in Human Subjects Research Protection, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 105 (1998) (describing the work of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission); Rita Marker, The Woodstock of Bioethics, HuM. Ln REv., Winter 1995,
at 35, 36-37 (describing a luncheon at which a prominent bioethicist encouraged
"bioethicists to position themselves to be on panels, boards and other [policy]-making
bodies"); Alan J. Weisbard, The Role of Philosophers in the Public Policy Process: A
View from the President's Commission, 97 ETHmcs 776 (1987) (describing the work of
the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Research).
3. See Arthur Caplan, Bioethics on Trial, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr.
1991, at 19, 20 (stating that bioethicists should not testify as experts); Richard Delgado
& Peter McAllen, The Moralist as Expert Witness, 62 B.U. L. REv. 869, 894-926 (1982)
(stating that normative ethics testimony should be subject to heightened scrutiny); John
C. Fletcher, Bioethics in a Legal Forum: Confessions of an "Expert" Witness, 22 J.
MED. & PHIL. 297, 310 (1997) (stating that bioethics testimony presents role strain for
bioethicists); Kenneth Kipnis, Confessions of an Expert Ethics Witness, 22 J. MED. &
PHIL. 325, 325 (1997) (stating that some consider the role of expert ethics witness as
inherently illicit); Douglas B. Mishkin, Proffering Bioethicists as Experts, JUDGES' J.,
Summer 1997, at 50, 89 (discussing the need for examination of standards for admission
of expert bioethics testimony); John J. Paris, An Ethicist Takes the Stand, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb. 1984, at 32, 32-33 (discussing the inability of courts to deal
appropriately with expert bioethics testimony); Edmund D. Pellegrino & Virginia Ashby
Sharpe, Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: The Need for Scrutiny, 32 PERSP. BIOLOGY &
MED. 547, 562 (1989) (arguing against admission of normative bioethics testimony);
Giles R. Scofield, Is the Medical Ethicist an "Expert"?, A.B.A. BIoETHICS BULL.,
Winter 1994, at 1, 1 (criticizing admission of bioethics testimony); Virginia A. Sharpe &
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal, 22 J. MED. &
PHIL. 373, 378 (1997) (stating that the use of ethics experts as normative authorities
remains problematic); Kevin Win. Wildes, Healthy Skepticism: The Emperor Has Very
Few Clothes, 22 J. MED. & PHIL. 365, 367 (1997) (stating that the use of ethics experts is
problematic in a morally pluralistic society).
4. Other concerns are that testifying in litigation destroys the impartiality required
of an ethicist, that it requires an ethicist to step out of the pedagogical role, and that
judges confuse ethics with law.
5. The Rule states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EviD. 702.
6. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has approved an amendment to
Rule 702 that reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
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affirmatively answer three basic questions before admitting expert
testimony: (1) does this witness qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education; (2) does the testimony consist of
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge; and (3) will the
testimony assist the trier of fact. Bioethics testimony presents distinctive
problems in each area, on which commentators have not necessarily
focused.
Part II of this Article addresses the question of expert qualifications.
First, it briefly surveys concerns about bioethics experts' qualifications.
Part II then suggests that judges should be aware of the problem of
generalization of expertise, in order to determine whether a bioethics
expert is qualified to testify about a particular issue and how to limit the
scope of the expert's testimony.
Part 1H addresses the question of reliability. After addressing
concerns regarding the reliability of nonscience testimony, it argues that,
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael,7 judges should require parties proffering expert bioethics
testimony to point to indicators of reliability used in the field of
bioethics, rather than categorically exclude normative bioethics
testimony.
Part IV outlines the concerns about the helpfulness of bioethics
testimony. It suggests that, to determine if bioethics testimony will be
helpful, judges should make a threshold assessment of the relation of the
bioethics testimony to current law. If the testimony conflicts directly
with law, or merely restates it, the testimony should not ordinarily be
admitted.
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, provided that (1) the
testimony is sufficiently based on reliable facts or data; (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Advisory Committee's Note on Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 702, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Fed. R. Civ. P. and Evid.: Request for Comment (1998).
Thus, the proposed amendments to Rule 702 would require that all expert testimony
admitted at trial to be "sufficiently based on reliable facts or data" and "the product of
reliable principles and methods," and that "the witness has reliably applied the principles
and methods to the facts of the case." Id. These views were confirmed by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). See
discussion infra Part m.A.3.
7. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
1047
II. QUALIFICATIONS OF BIOETHICS EXPERTS
A. Challenges to Qualifications of Bioethics Experts
1. General Concerns: "Generalization of Expertise"
Bioethics testimony is not an entirely unique courtroom phenomenon.
Authorities in legal ethics, accounting ethics, engineering ethics,
journalism ethics, and clergy ethics also provide expert testimony.8 But
the presence of bioethics experts has generated significantly greater
controversy than other kinds of ethics testimony, in part because
bioethics is an interdisciplinary field. As a result of this
interdisciplinarity, all bioethics experts do not testify about the practices
of their own profession in the same way as other ethics experts.9
Questions arise, therefore, about what qualifies these individuals as
experts. If an individual lacks the experience and knowledge of a
practicing physician or a bioscientist, what distinguishes the individual's
views about medicine or the biosciences from those of a lay person? If,
on the other hand, the bioethicist lacks specialized ethics knowledge,
training or experience, what distinguishes the bioethicist's ethical views
from a lay person's views?
Furthermore, even if the expert does seem to have some specialized
ethics knowledge or experience, critics of bioethics testimony frequently
assert that it is impossible to distinguish a good from a poor ethicist, and
by implication, a highly qualified from a less qualified or even an
unqualified one. The public is, after all, increasingly familiar with and
vocal about a range of bioethics issues. ° To pick out a few individuals
8. See Post Office v. Portec, Inc., 913 F.2d 802, 806-07 (10th Cir. 1990)
(engineering ethics testimony), vacated, 499 U.S. 915 (1991); United States v. Reed, 851
F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (legal ethics testimony), aff'd, 47 F.3d 288 (8th
Cir. 1995); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997) (clergy ethics testimony);
Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 364 A.2d 1080, 1089 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976) (journalist ethics testimony).
9. See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Inl.
1983) (non-physician testifying about ethical standards for medical research);
Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1988) (non-physician
testifying about ethical standards in medicine); In re Conroy, 457 A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1983) (non-physician testifying about ethical standards for end-of-life
medical care); In re Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App.
Div. 1987) (non-physicians testifying about ethical standards for medicine); see also
infra Part IV.A.4 (endorsing medical ethicists as experts on the standards of some health
professions).
10. Pellegrino and Sharpe, for example, state that "there is nothing in the training
of the ethicist that gives him or her de facto expertise or authority in deciding what is or
was the right and the good thing to do in a particular legal case." Pellegrino & Sharpe,
supra note 3, at 563. The popular press has also taken up this theme: "What qualifies
these professional moralists to tell us how we should behave? Not much." Dan
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as being "expert" seems vaguely undemocratic in a morally pluralistic
society."
[]f a Buddhist monk, Dr. Joyce Brothers, Ann Landers, and Abigail van Buren
all gave conflicting moral advice, there is no way to tell which of these four, if
any, speaks as a moral expert and to rank the extent of that expertise. We have
no such difficulty picking out experts, or judging who is more expert than who,
in the different branches of mathematics or physics, in marksmanship, cooking,
law, surgery, and the like.
12
Individuals testifying in court as bioethics experts are, of course,
usually not drawn from the ranks of advice columnists. Typically, they
are scholars and practitioners in medical and health care fields, such as
health care ethics. They tend to be highly-credentialed (usually Ph.D.s
and M.D.s), possessing a range of experiences a judge or jury would not
possess. As a result, the question with which courts have struggled is
not whether the purported expert is any more qualified to make
bioethical judgments than the average lay person, but rather whether the
credentials and experience the expert has-whether in medicine,
theology, philosophy, or another field-are precisely the right
qualifications to provide testimony about a particular bioethics issue. If
the particular qualifications are not precisely right, then the
"generalization of expertise" problem arises.'3 The Supreme Court of
Michigan stated that: "Once qualified to give an expert opinion, [Rule]
702 does not limit the scope of the expert's testimony. However, '[t]he
expert must be an expert in the precise problem as to which he
undertakes to testify.""..4  Convergence of a witness' expertise and the
issues to be decided is the problem motivating challenges to the
Seligman, Talking Back to the Ethicists, FORBES, May 5, 1997, at 198, 198.
11. See Giles R. Scofield, Ethics Consultation: The Least Dangerous Profession?,
2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEATi-cE ETmcs 417, 421-22 (1993) (critiquing professionalization
of medical ethics consultants); see also Jay Alexander Gold, Wiser than the Laws?: The
Legal Accountability of the Medical Profession, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 149 (1981)
(discussing the problem of expertise and the democratic principle in medicine); Kevin
Win. Wildes, Particularism in Bioethics: Balancing Secular and Religious Concerns, 53
MD. L. REv. 1220, 1230-31 (1994) (stating that moral pluralism poses intractable
problems for bioethics).
12. RONALD SUTER, ARE You MORAL? 55 (1984).
13. Robert M. Veatch, Generalization of Expertise, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIEs
29, 29 (1973); see Gold, supra note 11, at 171.
14. People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 406 (Mich. 1990) (holding expert
testimony of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome admissible but only as
rebuttal evidence) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Zimmerman, 189 N.W.2d
259, 275 (Mich. 1971) (holding expert testimony on speed of oncoming automobile
inadmissible)).
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qualification of bioethics experts. 5 The cases discussed below illustrate
this particular issue.
2. Wetherill v. University of Chicago: Ethics Professor Testimony
Admitted Regardless of His Lack of Medical Training
In Wetherill v. University of Chicago,6 the federal district court was
asked to decide if an expert witness had precisely the right credentials
and experience to testify regarding the standards of informed consent in
research. This 1983 case is one of only two cases in which discussions
of the qualifications of such experts have been published. 7 It illustrates
the kind of hurdle that nonscientist experts in bioethics must overcome
to be considered qualified.
Plaintiffs Rachel Wetherill and Maureen Rogers alleged they were
injured by prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES).8 They claimed
that the University of Chicago battered them in utero by subjecting their
mothers to medical experimentation without knowledge or consent.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the University and its employees committed
malpractice. In addition, the plaintiffs sought recovery against the
University and against Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of DES, on strict
15. See Gray v. Briggs, 45 F. Supp. 2d 316, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (excluding
testimony of expert in securities where expertise and the issues to be decided did not
converge).
16. 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
17. Additionally, an expert bioethics witness described having his qualifications
challenged by Dr. Jack Kevorkian's attorney in a 1991 trial:
Geoffrey Fieger, Dr. Kevorkian's attorney, seemed genuinely puzzled
when the prosecution called me to testify. He had not spent any time
wondering about the qualifications of the two previous witnesses-I suspect
because they are physicians. I, however, was an entirely different creature, one
that had no obvious place in his bestiary of experts.
For nearly an hour Mr. Fieger challenged my credentials as an expert.
Fieger flailed away at my curriculum vitae, academic training, previous
research and teaching positions, and my professional affiliations. He asked if I
were a Nazi or a practicing homosexual since I had written articles that
touched on these topics and he did not understand the basis of my expertise in
either area. I understood what Fieger was trying to do-cast doubt on my
testimony and rattle me as a witness-and that it was his job to do this. I
understood, yet I was not always able to restrain myself from replying to his
questions with a barbed response. The media, omnipresent at the trial, ate up
what were, if nothing else, lively exchanges.
Finally, Judge Gilbert, seeming to tire of this banter, lifted up my cv,
which had been introduced into evidence, and pronounced herself impressed
with its bulk. Mr. Modelski quickly noted that I had been qualified as an
expert in medical ethics in another trial in another state and that ended the
logjam; expert status was conferred on me.
Caplan, supra note 3, at 20.
18. See Wetherill, 565 F. Supp. at 1556.
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liability grounds. 9
The plaintiffs proffered a professor of ethics as an expert witness to
testify about standards of informed consent.20 The University argued
that the expert could not provide the requisite expertise because he was
too young to have personal knowledge of physicians' practices and,
more importantly for the issue of generalization of expertise, he was not
a licensed physicianY.2
The court turned to Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Because Rule 702
permits expert witnesses to form their opinions through studying the
work of others rather than by first-hand empirical observations alone, the
court decided that the defendant's first objection-that the expert was
too young-was not persuasive.2 The second objection-that the expert
was not a licensed physician-also failed."
The court noted that the expert was an associate professor of ethics in
a university department of internal medicine, as well as a member of an
institutional review board, and that he had published extensively in the
field of medical ethics and experimentation.2 On that basis, the court
determined that despite the fact that he was not a physician, the expert
was "eminently qualified" to testify whether then-prevailing ethical
practices required the disclosure of the risks which had not been
disclosed.26 The court also found him qualified to testify about sources
of disclosure standards other than hospital practices. In fact, it found
him "particularly well suited-more so than the vast majority of
physicians-to testify as to alternative sources of disclosure standards."'
Fairly standard criteria were used by the Wetherill court to determine
whether the witness was qualified to testify as an expert on standards of
disclosure despite the fact that he was not medically trained. The three
criteria the court used were: professional credentials, experience, and
scholarly publications. The defendants did not challenge, nor did the
court discuss, whether this individual could legitimately be chosen as
more qualified than others to testify about ethical matters in general.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1563.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1563-64.






Instead, the court assumed that some ethics-related expertise existed, and
pursued the more pragmatic question: whether the particular expertise
the witness possessed converged with the medically-related issue the
court was to address, or whether admitting his testimony would amount
to unwarranted generalization of expertise."
Another variation to the challenge of avoiding generalization of
expertise in qualifying ethics experts arose several years later. This
time, the Tennessee Supreme Court criticized a trial court for
overgeneralizing a witness's expertise.
3. Davis v. Davis: Admission of Geneticist Testimony Criticized for
Expert's Lack of Ethical Expertise
The qualifications of an expert witness were questioned in dicta by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis.0 In 1989, the trial court
had determined how to dispose of a divorced couple's seven
cryogenically preserved products of in vitro fertilization?' The wife
wanted to use the seven embryos to attempt to have a child over her
husband's objection." Five expert witnesses offered testimony at the
trial, including the reproductive endocrinologist who performed the in
vitro fertilization procedures on Mrs. Davis.33
Four of the experts, testifying for Mr. Davis, characterized the
disputed in vitro fertilization (IVF) products as preembryos rather than
as embryos.34 A geneticist testifying for Mrs. Davis, however, objected
to drawing a distinction between preembryos and embryos. The trial
court judge found the geneticist's testimony persuasive, and held for
Mrs. Davis. 6
Davis was appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which held in
favor of Mr. Davis. 7 Criticizing the lower court's reliance on the
geneticist's testimony, the court noted that the geneticist's background
failed to reflect any expertise in obstetrics, gynecology, or medical
ethics.38 Further, the court noted that that his testimony revealed a
profound confusion between science and religion. Moreover, the court
29. See id.
30. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
31. See id. at 589.
32. See id.
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stated that had the lower court judge been similarly convinced that the
geneticist's training was not in itself sufficient to qualify him as an
expert in the area of bioethics, he might not have been permitted to
testify. Unlike the expert in Wetherill, however, whose qualifications
were challenged because they were not in medicine, this particular
expert's qualifications were criticized because they were not in ethics.
Commentators have been concerned with determining whether ethical
expertise can exist," or, assuming that it does exist, whether it should be
recognized in a democratic society. The more practical question courts
have dealt with is whether the testimony bioethics experts offer is
appropriate for the question at hand. Wetherill and Davis illustrate the
significant generalization risk accompanying bioethics expert testimony:
whether a witness who clearly has expertise in one area of this highly
interdisciplinary field may testify about a matter that is outside that area
of expertise.
B. Future Challenges: Specialization and Interdisciplinarity
Courts will increasingly need to consider the problem of
generalization of bioethics expertise. A potential witness' expertise may
or may not correspond to the area of bioethics in which expert testimony
is needed.4' The importance of this issue will increase in the future, if
courts continue to attempt to keep expert testimony within the witness'
designated area of expertise, either by excluding it altogether if the
witness is insufficiently qualified, or by limiting testimony once the
40. See A. L. Caplan, Moral Experts and Moral Expertise: Do Either Exist?, in
CLINICAL ETHics: THEORY AND PRACTICE 59-87 (1989) (B. Hoffmaster et al. eds., 1989)
(surveying objections to moral expertise and concluding that moral expertise does exist);
Jan Crosthwaite, Moral Expertise: A Problem in the Professional Ethics of Professional
Ethicists, 9 BioETnics, 5:361-79 (1995) (stating that an expert ethical opinion requires
skills, knowledge, and values, resulting in a critically examined moral perspective);
Cheryl N. Noble, Ethics and Experts, 12 HASTINGS CENTER Rpr., June 1982, at 7, 7-15
(critiquing claim to expertise in applied ethics); Bruce D. Weinstein, The Possibility of
Ethical Expertise, 15 THEORETIcAL MED. 61, 61-75 (1994) [hereinafter Weinstein,
Possibility] (stating that the four senses of ethical expertise include expertise in
descriptive ethics, expertise in metaethics, expertise in normative ethics, and expertise in
living a good life); Bruce D. Weinstein, What Is an Expert?, 14 THEORETICAL MED. 57,
57-71 (1993) (stating the distinction between epistemic expertise and performative
expertise); Scott D. Yoder, Experts in Ethics? The Nature of Ethical Expertise, 28
HASTINGS CENTER Rpr., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 11, 11-12 (stating that misconceptions
muddle the debate about ethics expertise).
41. But see Yoder, supra note 40, at 16-18 (stating that bioethics expertise does
not require specialization).
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witness has been qualified.42
The issue's importance will correspondingly increase as the field of
bioethics becomes more specialized and more interdisciplinary."
Twenty years ago a bioethicist who was an expert in the ethics of human
subjects research might also have been viewed as an expert in a half-
dozen other areas of bioethics. Today, such broad-ranging attribution of
expertise would be even more suspect than the attribution of expertise in
the ethics of human subjects research was to a non-physician in the 1983
Wetherill case. At that time, bioethicists came almost exclusively from
42, See Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 874 (2d Cir. 1994) (excluding
sociologist's testimony on sufficiency of police officers' training in domestic violence
because witness lacked expertise in either criminology or domestic violence); Berry v.
City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir. 1994) (excluding testimony that excessive
force by police was caused by failure to discipline officers who had committed similar
acts because sociologist expert was unqualified and testimony was unreliable); Crespo v.
McCartin, 582 A.2d 1011, 1016 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that plaintiff's
medical expert was insufficiently qualified to testify to the standard of care for treating
an ectopic pregnancy). For limitations of novel testimony, see People v. Bowker, 249
Cal. Rptr. 886, 891-92 (Ct. App. 1988) (admitting expert testimony of child abuse
accommodation syndrome but limiting testimony to popular "myths" that would affect
jury's consideration of witness credibility); People v. Beckley, 409 N.W.2d 759, 763
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (admitting expert testimony of child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome but only as rebuttal evidence); People v. Beckford, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462, 465
(Sup. Ct. 1988) (admitting expert identification testimony in a robbery case provided
there was a limit to the testimony and a limiting charge to the jury). But see McMillan v.
Durant, 439 S.E.2d 829, 832 (S.C. 1993) (holding that a practitioner's experience
teaching in a particular specialty and his professional interaction with practitioners of
that specialty are facts sufficient to support his qualification as an expert, and defects in
qualification go to weight rather than admissibility); State v. Best, 232 N.W.2d 447, 454
(S.D. 1975) (holding that a lack of specialization may affect the weight of the testimony,
but the trial judge need not find such expert testimony incompetent).
43. The major reference works in bioethics show the effect of increasing
specialization in the field. The first edition of the Encyclopedia of Bioethics included
315 articles, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioEmIcs (1978); the second edition included 464
articles, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoETmcs (2d ed. 1995). The current edition of the
Bibliography of Bioethics is divided into 15 major topics and 51 subtopics. See
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BIoETHICS at v-vii (1999). An editor of one of the major journals in
the field observed:
[T]he... compelling pattern in the bioethics journal literature is an
evolutionary one, of the continual elaboration of new issues within a broad
domain through ever more finely differentiated analyses reaching ever greater
levels of delicacy. This might be called a pattern of specialization: Over time,
clusters of issues that form a "family" differentiate into identifiably discrete
lines of inquiry ("genuses"), which in their turn give rise to even finer
distinctions and the emergence of "species" as increasingly specialized
discussion focus on issues raised in ever more narrowly circumscribed
domains. This pattern, I suggest, seems best to capture the dynamics at the
intellectual core of bioethics as a discipline, to pick out its most defining
issues.
Bette-Jane Crigger, As Time Goes By: An Intellectual Ethnography of Bioethics, in
BIOETHICS AND SOCIETY: CONSTRUCTING THE ETHICAL ENTERPRISE 192, 208-09
(Raymond DeVries & Janardan Subedi eds., 1998).
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the fields of philosophy, theology, law, and medicine; today bioethicists
are trained in numerous other fields as well.4 For instance, a geneticist
could very well have the ethics expertise needed by a court.5 As a
result, the questions of whether general expertise in the field of bioethics
is sufficient qualification to testify as an expert, and when a witness'
testimony should be limited to a particular subfield or to a particular
question in bioethics, will be faced with increasing frequency.
Despite the need for increased attention to the issues of specialization
and interdisciplinarity in bioethics experts, the qualifications of a
bioethics expert are not likely to be the most controversial Rule 702
issue to arise. The more pressing and difficult question will likely be
whether bioethics testimony offers something worthwhile to the legal
system. Exploration of this question will fall into two parts: the Rule
702 reliability inquiry, and the Rule 702 helpfulness inquiry.
Ill. RELIABILITY OF BIOETHICS TESTiMONY
A. Challenges to the Reliability of Bioethics Testimony
1. General Concerns: Exclusion of Normative Bioethics Testimony
Commentators have been highly skeptical about the reliability of
bioethics testimony. One commentator has claimed that so-called
experts in ethics "disagree so much and so radically that we hesitate to
say that they are experts."46  An amicus brief submitted to a
Massachusetts court echoed this complaint, stating "[t]here is, and can
be, no objective criteria in this area." A third commentator stated:
Ultimately, the claims [ethicists] make simply cannot be proven because
ethics is not like mathematics or the physical sciences. Value systems cannot be
reduced to taxonomies, nor moral reasoning to algorithmic certainty. Even if
44. See Raymond DeVries & Janardan Subedi, Preface to BIOETHICS AND
SOcmTY, supra note 43, at xiv-xv (stating that although bioethics has existed as an
organized movement for decades, it attracted little sociological attention until recently).
45. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 50 (observing that the explosion of ethical issues
related to genetics may increase the use of bioethics experts).
46. J. R. Bambrough, Plato's Political Analogies, in PLATO, POPPER AND POLICS
152, 168 (R. Bambrough ed., 1967).
47. Weinstein, Possibility, supra note 40, at 65 (citing G. J. Annas & L. H. Glantz,
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626
(Mass. 1986)). Bioethics testimony was, nevertheless, admitted in Brophy. See Brophy,
497 N.E.2d at 630. But see Pellegrino & Sharpe, supra note 3, at 549 (criticizing the use
of this testimony).
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we could agree about the values that should form the basis of ethical decision
making, there are no objective truths about how those values will or should be
weighed by different persons in the same or different situations. However much
[ethicists] may believe that they can reduce moral problems ... to systematic,
predictable manageability, human judgment in matters of conscience remains an
uncertain, probabilistic exercise of human discretion. 48
Commentators have tried to resolve problems involving the reliability
of bioethics testimony by using a construct employed in philosophy.
This construct divides ethics into three categories: descriptive ethics,
metaethics, and normative ethics.
Descriptive ethics is understood as the study of what ethical principles
or norms actually guide behavior.49 For example, identifying the practice
of infanticide in ancient Greece provides evidence that the ancient
Greeks did not in fact prohibit infanticide. Descriptive ethics would also
include attention to what Greek laws and thinkers said about the practice
of infanticide. Metaethics is the study of language, concepts, and
theories relevant to ethical theory ---for instance, the meaning of ethical
language, such as the meaning of the term "good," and the relevance of
theories, such as the theory of personhood or human nature, that bear on
the applications of ethical norms are metaethics concepts. Normative
ethics evaluates and justifies ethical concepts, practices, and theories and
is generally regarded as a theoretical enterprise; in the debate over ethics
expert testimony, it is often treated as a body of knowledge consisting in
prescriptive statements or normative standards.5 McAllen and Delgado
originally borrowed this tripartite scheme from philosophy in order to
illustrate and analyze several potential functions of ethics experts in
48. Scofield, supra note 11, at 420.
49. Beauchamp and Childress explain descriptive ethics as follows: "[D]escriptive
ethics is the factual investigation of moral behavior and beliefs. It uses standard
scientific techniques to study how people reason and act. For example, anthropologists,
sociologists, psychologists and historians determine which moral norms and attitudes are
expressed in professional practice, in codes, and in public policies." TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics 4-5 (4th ed.
1994).
50. Beauchamp and Childress explain metaethics as follows:
[M]etaethics [is] analysis of the language, concepts, and methods of reasoning
in ethics. For example, it addresses the meanings of such ethical terms as
right, obligation, virtue, principle, justification, sympathy, morality, and
responsibility. It also includes study of moral epistemology (the theory of
moral knowledge) and the logic and patterns of moral reasoning and
justification. Metaethical questions for analysis include whether social
morality is objective or subjective, relative or nonrelative, and rational or
emotive.
Id. at5.
51. Beauchamp and Childress explain normative ethics as follows: "Normative
ethics [is] ... [i]nquiry that attempts to answer the question 'Wich... norms for the
guidance and evaluation of conduct are worthy of moral acceptance and for what
reasons?"' Id. at 4.
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litigation, explaining,
[lt is possible to distinguish three branches of inquiry: descriptive ethics,
metaethics, and normative ethics. Testimony under these various headings
implicates a corresponding variety of evidentiary considerations. As a result, it
can be expected that such testimony will meet different degrees of resistance by
the judicial system. Of course, not all potential functions of expert moralists fit
neatly within this tripartite division; to some extent, the categories overlap and
merge. A question concerning the nature of a person's religious beliefs, for
example, could fall under any or all of the three subheadings depending upon
the purpose of the ethicist's response. Nonetheless, the suggested subdivision
offers a useful starting point for illustration and analysis of the ethicist's
potential functions.
52
Since McAllen and Delgado's work in 1982, the majority of
commentators on ethics expert testimony have become convinced that
normative bioethics testimony is less reliable than other kinds of
bioethics testimony."3 While both descriptive ethics and metaethics
could be appropriately used in the courtroom, normative ethics could not
be, under this view.'
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Scientific
Expert Testimony Standards
Precisely how the reliability of bioethics testimony should be
evaluated has never been directly addressed by a court. However, the
appropriate test for determining the reliability of nonscience testimony
in general has been widely debated, especially since the Supreme
Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.55 In Daubert, the Court clarified standards for determining whether
52. Delgado & McAllen, supra note 3, at 875-76.
53. See Scofield, supra note 3, at 2.
54. See Pellegrino & Sharpe, supra note 3, at 559 (recommending that normative
testimony be excluded from evidence, and that ethics experts be confined to descriptive
and metaethical testimony). Wildes similarly views the tripartite division as an
important distinction and consequently urges that normative testimony be excluded from
the courtroom. See Wildes, supra note 3, at 366-67. Although Mishkin admits that the
categories of descriptive, metaethical and normative ethics are fuzzy, he nevertheless
urges judges to limit ethics testimony to descriptive testimony about a particular school
of thought. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 51, 89. The tripartite division has thus been
elevated during the course of the debate about ethics expert testimony from a "starting
point for illustration and analysis" to the evidentiary screening device of choice among
commentators.
55. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See generally Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32
GA. L. REV. 699 (1998) (stating that Daubert has created problems for lower courts
because the opinion gave a mixed message); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step
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expert scientific testimony is reliable.56 Among the factors the Court
said a judge may consider are whether: (1) the expert's theory or
technique can be and has been empirically tested; (2) the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error is acceptable; and (4) the theory or
technique is generally accepted by the scientific community.57 These
gatekeeping criteria are known as the "Daubert factors." Daubert
seemed to leave open, however, whether these criteria apply to expert
testimony that does not purport to be scientific.5
Since the Daubert decision, some courts have found that the criteria
are inapplicable to nonscience expert testimony. 9 Others have applied
Daubert to technical and specialized knowledge as well as to science.60
Still others have concluded that Daubert can be applied to nonscience
testimony, but that it must be modified in those circumstances. 6'
Recently the Supreme Court decided the case of Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael,62 clarifying some aspects of this debate about the criteria for
determining the reliability of non-science expert testimony.
After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the
Reliability of Nonscientific Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 (1994) (assessing that
the reliability of nonscience testimony may be more difficult than assessing science
testimony); Teresa S. Renaker, Evidentiary Legerdemain: Deciding when Daubert
Should Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1657 (1996) (stating that the
scope of Daubert has been expanded to cover all expert testimony); Jennifer Laser, Note,
Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1379
(1997) (stating that Daubert left unanswered important questions about its application to
nonscience testimony).
56. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. In Daubert, the Supreme Court determined that
the long-standing Frye "general acceptance" standard had been superseded by the
standard embodied in Rule 702. See id. at 586. Under Frye, judges in their gatekeeping
role were to defer to the judgments of scientists regarding novel scientific evidence. See
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). Under Daubert, however, judges
themselves must decide if inferences and assertions have been derived by scientific
method. See 509 U.S. at 592.
57. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
58. See id. at 599-600.
59. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Daubert does not apply to a handwriting analysis expert); United States v. Starzecpyzel,
880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that forensic document evidence
examination (FDE) testimony did not satisfy the Daubert standard but holding the
testimony admissible, nonetheless, because Daubert is not applicable to FDE testimony).
60. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1348 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
sociologist not qualified to testify that failure to discipline police officers was proximate
cause of police shooting), reh'g denied, Berry v. City of Detroit, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
23079 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 1994), cert. denied, Berry v. City of Detroit, 513 U.S. 1111
(1995).
61. See Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding social science testimony improperly excluded because testimony was based on
peer reviewed articles and method was well-accepted in the field of social science).
62. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
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3. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael: Modified Standards for
Nonscience Expert Testimony
Kumho Tire was a products liability action against the manufacturers
and distributors of a steel belted radial automobile tire. 6  The tire blew
out during a cross-country trip the Carmichael family was taking in July
of 1993, resulting in a motor vehicle accident, serious injuries to several
members of the family, and the death of a child.64 The plaintiffs claimed
that the tire was defective. 5
The district court excluded the expert testimony of a tire failure
analyst who was to testify that a defect in the tire's manufacture and
design caused the tire to blow out.4 The expert used a two-factor test
and visual/tactile inspection. Using this method, the expert concluded
that, unless a failed tire showed certain signs of wear or abuse, a
manufacturing defect caused the failure.67 The expert's testimony was
excluded on grounds that it was unreliable because it failed to meet the
Daubert factors. 6 Because the expert's testimony provided the only
evidence of a tire defect, the district court granted the petitioner's motion
for a summary judgment.69
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court had erred as a matter of law in applying Daubert. It reasoned that
Daubert could not be applied because the testimony rested on a
"technical" rather than a "scientific" analysis."
The question presented to the Supreme Court was, does Daubert's
gatekeeping function apply only to "scientific" testimony or to all expert
testimony. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, found that the
gatekeeping function applies to all expert testimony, for several
reasons.7" First, the language of Rule 702 makes no relevant distinction
between scientific knowledge and technical or other specialized
knowledge.12  The word "knowledge," rather than its modifier
("scientific," "technical," or "other specialized"), establishes the




67. See id. at 1171-73.
68. See id. at 1173.
69. See id.
70. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1997).
71. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1174.
72. See id.
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standard of evidentiary reliability.7
Second, the rationale underlying the Daubert Court's "gatekeeping"
determination was not limited to "scientific" knowledge.74 The Federal
Rules grant testimonial latitude to all experts on the "assumption that the
expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of his discipline."75
Finally, the Kumho Tire Court stated that it would be difficult or
impossible to administer evidentiary rules based on a distinction
between scientific and technical or other specialized knowledge.76 It saw
no clear dividing line among them, and further, no need to make such a
distinction.77
More specifically, the Court addressed whether trial judges
determining the admissibility of an engineering expert's testimony may
be allowed to consider the Daubert factors. The Court said that judges
may consider those factors, but refused to categorically rule on their
applicability. The Court also refused to rule on the applicability of the
Daubert factors for subsets of cases defined by type of expert or kind of
evidence. In the Court's view, the decision would depend upon the
particular circumstances of each case, making such line drawing
unfeasible." Thus, the determination of what measures of reliability to
use should be made on a case by case basis.
Justice Breyer further noted that Daubert itself emphasized the
flexibility of the Rule 702 inquiry.0 Despite this flexibility, Justice
Breyer emphasized the importance of not obscuring the overarching goal
of Daubert's gatekeeping requirement: ensuring that the same level of
intellectual rigor characterizing practice in a particular field is applied to
expert testimony in the courtroom." The Court thus endorsed a rigorous
standard of reliability for all expert witnesses while limiting the
application of specifically scientific standards to all expert witnesses.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)).
76. See id. at 1174.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1175.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. Chief Judge Posner formulated the test. See, e.g., Tyus v. Urban
Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Daubert requirement of
some degree of rigor in courtroom as professional practice applies to social science
expert testimony), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1251 (1997); Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d
230, 234 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding method of analyzing lung tissue for asbestos as
insufficiently rigorous), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 992 (1996); Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
78 F.3d 316, 318-19 (7th. Cir. 1996) (rejecting cardiologist's expert testimony because
method insufficiently rigorous), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 819 (1996).
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The Supreme Court found that the district court's decision regarding
the tire failure analyst's testimony in Kumho Tire was lawfilY. The
specific issue before the trial court had been whether the expert's
method could reliably determine the likelihood that a defect in the tire
caused its tread to separate from its carcass. 3 The plaintiffs wanted the
reliability inquiry to focus at a more general level. But the Court
determined that the reliability inquiry should be quite specific and
narrow. The expert's method, understood at a general level as a way to
predict whether overdeflection had caused the tire's tread to separate
from its steel belted carcass, might have been reliable. But when the
method was viewed more specifically, as a way of predicting whether a
defect in the tire at issue caused its tread to separate from its carcass, it
failed to satisfy either the Daubert factors or any other set of reasonable
reliability criteria. It was thus properly excluded, according to the
Court.1
B. Future Challenges: Conflict Between Kumho Tire and Ethical
Theories-Normativity, Principlism, and Casuistry
What are the implications of Kumho Tire for assessing the reliability
of bioethics testimony? Despite widespread endorsement by
commentators, a criterion of non-normativity for determining reliability
meshes poorly with the Kumho Tire standard for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court in both Kumho Tire and Daubert noted that the
gatekeeping inquiry must be "'tied to the facts' of a particular 'case."' 85
The tripartite division of ethics is not tied to the facts of a case, but
focuses instead on distinguishing general categories of ethics. The
Kumho Tire Court was also unwilling to draw fine lines in order to
categorically separate scientific from technical or other specialized
knowledge. It is unlikely that categorically separating normative ethics
testimony from other ethics testimony in order to exclude the former
would be viewed any more favorably on appeal.
Second, Kumho Tire requires that standards of reliability correspond
82. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1178.
83. Justice Stevens dissented from this part of the opinion because he thought it
"neither fair to litigants nor good practice for this Court to reach out to decide questions
not raised by the certiorari petition." Id. at 1179.
84. See id. at 1178.
85. Id. at 1175 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591
(1993) (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985))).
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to those used in practice. The tripartite division is not widely used in
bioethics practice. In discussion of testimony, ethics expert
commentators do commonly advert to the normative-descriptive-
metaethical distinction. But, in their work as consultants, ethics
committee members, or commission members, they do not employ the
distinction in order to exclude normative judgments.
Underlying the separation of normative from metaethical or
descriptive judgment is the fact-value distinction that became a
philosophical truism for much of twentieth century ethics.8 6  The
disjunctive character of this distinction, however, has been seriously
questioned by many philosophers," who do not believe that it is possible
to separate facts and values to the degree that the normative, metaethics,
and descriptive ethics advocates imply. By insisting that experts
replicate standards that exist in the field, Kumho Tire should discourage
judges from using a strict division between normative and other
bioethics testimony to reject unreliable testimony.
But what should judges use as indicators of the reliability of bioethics
testimony? In 1982, Delgado and McAllen suggested that ethics experts
from particular schools of thought could represent views that were
"consonant with the considered moral judgments of our society." 8
Presumably, they believed that consonance with social views was a good
indicator of reliability. They suggested that such experts could be drawn
from classical schools of ethical thought such as utilitarianism or
deontology.8 9 It is doubtful, however, that any method tested at the
"schools" level of generality could be sufficiently "tied to the facts of a
particular case" to pass Kumho Tire scrutiny.
Today, there are several approaches under discussion and in use in
bioethics that borrow from the classical schools and are somewhat more
specified. Principlism is foremost among them. °  It has been
86. Proponents of the fact-value distinction hold that one cannot logically move
directly from a statement of fact about "what is" to a statement of value about "what
ought to be." See generally R. M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1972); GEORGE
EDWARD MOORE, PRINcn'IA ETHICA (1978).
87. See generally G. J. WARNOCK, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY (W.D.
Hudson ed., 1967); R. M. Hare, Descriptivism, 49 PROCEEDING OF THE BRITISH
ACADEMY 115 (1963); Jan Narveson, Is There a Problem About "Applied" Ethics?, in
APPLIED ETHICS AND ETHICAL THEORY 100 (David M. Rosenthal & Fadlou Shehadi eds.,
1988); James Rachels, Can Ethics Provide Answers?, in APPLIED ETHICS AND ETHICAL
THEORY 3 (David M. Rosenthal & Fadlou Shehadi eds., 1988); John R. Searle, How to
Derive "Ought"from "Is", 73 PHIL. REV. 43, 43-48 (1964). The division is rejected in
pragmatic philosophy, which some argue best characterizes bioethics practice. See
generally Glenn McGee, Introduction to PRAGMATIC BIoETHIcs at ix, xiii-xiv (Glenn
McGee ed., 1999).
88. Delgado & McAllen, supra note 3, at 904.
89. See id. at 907-13.
90. Principlism, or the four-principled approach to biomedical ethics, is explained
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extensively reviewed and is generally (though certainly not universally)
accepted; it therefore has at least the potential to meet several of the
Daubert reliability criteria. As one observer of the field recently noted:
[Beauchamp and Childress] tried to systematize bioethics by creating a set of
bioethical principles that could be applied to all bioethical cases ....
"Principlism," as the approach came to be known... was articulated in Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress's (1994) Principles of Biomedical Ethics,
which originally was published in late 1977 and has become the document in
bioethics most resembling a common disciplinary charter. The four principles
articulated by Beauchamp and Childress in their book-autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, the "Georgetown mantra"-promised
in their formulation an operationalizable tool for evaluating and adjudicating
case-based ethical dilemmas. Though principlism has been assaulted, criticized,
or amended by a host of critics ever since, it was quickly adopted as the
standard approach to bioethical issues, its seminal contribution is widely
acknowledged, and its vocabulary and basic principles remain at the center of
bioethical debate.91
Principlism in its early versions may have had only marginally greater
potential for application at the level of specificity Kumho Tire requires
than would utilitarianism or deontology. It was regularly criticized for
its inability to provide strategies for deciding between conflicting
principles or conflicting ways of balancing the principles.9 As a result,
Beauchamp and Childress incorporated the notion of "specification" in
their most recent revision of The Principles of Biomedical Ethics.93
by Beauchamp and Childress as follows:
Principles are general guides that leave considerable room for judgment in
specific cases and that provide substantive guidance for the development of
more detailed rules and policies....
The four clusters of principles are (1) respect for autonomy (a norm of
respecting the decisionmaking capacities of autonomous persons), (2)
nonmaleficence (a norm of avoiding the causation of harm), (3) beneficence (a
group of norms for providing benefits and balancing benefits against risks and
costs), and (4) justice (a group of norms for distributing benefits, risks, and
costs fairly).
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 49, at 38.
91. Paul Root Wolpe, The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A
Sociological View, in BIoETI'cs AND SOCIETY, supra note 43, at 38, 41 (citations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
92. See generally BERNARD GERT ET AL., BIOETHICS: A RETURN TO
FUNDAMENTALS (1997); PARK RIDGE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HEALTH, FAITH, AND
ET-Cs, A MATTER OF PRNciPLEs? FERMENT IN U.S. BIoETHIcs (Edwin R. DuBose et al.
eds., 1994); K. Danner Clouser & Bernard Gert, A Critique of Principlism, 15 J. MED. &
PHIL. 219, 221-23 (1990) (stating that the principles are not guides to action, and often
conflict with each other); David Degrazia, Moving Forward in Bioethical Theory:
Theories, Cases, and Specified Principlism, 17 J. MNE. & PHIL. 511, 511-39 (1992).
93. See BEAucHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 49, at 28-37.
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Whether that move will result in a method that can be sufficiently tied to
cases will be a matter for courts to decide in the future.
Another candidate for a generally accepted method of bioethics is
casuistry.9 Casuistry is, by definition, 5 "tied to cases," but Kumho Tire
criteria seem to require that expert testimony be tied not simply to cases
generally, but to a specific question or matter at issue in the particular
case in which the expert is giving testimony. It is thus an open question
whether either principlism or casuistry would survive Kumho Tire
reliability scrutiny.
In addition to this obstacle to reliability, principlism and casuistry are
not strictly speaking practical procedures, but theoretical understandings
of bioethics that have a formal methodological component (though they
are often referred to as methods). The Kumho Tire Court focused on the
adequacy of a particular method to answer specific questions at issue in
the case, not its adequacy to serve as a general "philosophical" approach
or approach to a field. It is unclear, therefore, that either principlism or
casuistry can provide the kind of specificity that the Kumho Tire criteria
envision. To meet the Kumho Tire reliability standard, courts would
need to assess the degree to which actually-employed bioethics methods
or procedures answer the specific matters on which testimony is given.96
94. See generally ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
95. Casuistry is defined as follows:
Casuistry... focuses on practical decisionmaking in particular cases....
Appropriate moral judgment occur... through an intimate understanding of
particular situations and the historical record of similar cases.
"'" [C]asuists dispute the use of the model of scientific theory for ethical
theory, the accompanying account of moral judgments, and the insistence on
firm, universal principles.
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 49, at 92-94.
96. The Kumho Tire requirement that standards of reliability correspond to those
used in practice suggests that the processes involved in bioethics research and clinical
bioethics would be what a Kumho Tire-inspired court would likely examine; thus,
scrutiny of specific research methods or methods of inquiry that have general acceptance
or meet peer review standards would be needed. Experience-based reliability and
expertise have not been well explored within the field. Only Chervenak and
McCullough have attempted to address the issue. See LAURENCE B. MCCULLOUGH &
FRANK A. CHERVENAK, ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 43-44 (1994). The
lack of discussion of standards of reliability in the field raises the question whether the
field of bioethics is methodologically rigorous enough to pass Kumho Tire scrutiny
regardless of how well accepted or well reviewed certain methods are within its ranks.
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IV. HELPFULNESS OF BIOETHICS TESTIMONY
A. Challenges to the Helpfidness of Bioethics Expert Testimony
1. General Concerns: Ethics Expertise or Just Common Sense
The third issue that judges must address when considering whether to
admit expert testimony is whether the testimony will be helpful.
Although a 1990 study of judicial decision making about life sustaining
treatment reported that judges who had received a variety of information
aids frequently found the testimony of ethicists persuasive or useful,97
commentators have worried that bioethics testimony would not actually
help courts. Some see ethics testimony as merely the expression of
common sense, not specialized or esoteric enough to be helpful.98 Others
see it as testimony merely telling the judge or jury which result to
reach.99 Neither type of testimony would meet the standards for Rule
702, which requires testimony to aid in understanding the evidence or
determining a fact in issue.Y
Occasionally, in particular cases, judges have determined that
bioethics testimony would not be helpful. Contrary to what
commentators have suggested, however, the unhelpfulness of bioethics
testimony was neither the result of its common sensical nature nor of its
conclusory nature. Rather, the bioethics testimony was not helpful to the
97. In cases about foregoing life sustaining medical treatment, these aids included
medical or ethical guidelines or codes of ethics, nursing home or hospital policies and
regulations, review by a hospital ethics committee, prognosis committee, ethics
consultation services, testimony of the patient, testimony of a representative of the state,
an amicus curiae brief, a document purported to express the wishes of the patient, advice
of a resource judge, and testimony of an ethicist. See generally Thomas L. Hafemeister
& Donna M. Robinson, The Views of the Judiciary Regarding Life-Sustaining Medical
Treatment Decisions, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 189 (1994) (reporting results of their
1990 study of state trial court judges).
98. See Scofield, supra note 3, at 2.
99. An advisory committee note to Rule 704 suggests that such testimony would
be the paradigm of unhelpful expert testimony. See FED. R. EviD. 704 advisory
committee's note. Critics of ethics testimony have claimed, "'Expert testimony' in this
area... consists of nothing more than... medical ethicists stating what they believe is
right and wrong." Weinstein, Possibility, supra note 40, at 65 (quoting G.J. Annes &
L.H. Glantz, Brief of Ainicus Curiae, Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497
N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986)).
100. See generally John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony:
Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L.
REV. 349 (1992) (describing the function of expert testimony within the litigation
process).
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court because it conflicted with law.'0 ' Two cases illustrate this
bioethics-law conflict.
2. Expert Testimony Which Conflicts with State Law
a. Sarka v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center
In Sarka v. Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center,'02 the
plaintiff, a child, brought an action against hospitals and physicians
alleging that negligence during a childbirth procedure resulted in
neurological injury. The defendants claimed the injury may have been
caused by a congenital condition and sought a court order for diagnostic
tests to support their position. At the trial level, the court ordered the
plaintiff to submit to a physical examination including magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) and/or a computed axial tomography (CT)
scan.0 3 These procedures were the only remaining diagnostic techniques
that could determine whether the child's condition was a congenital
condition or a condition due to negligence. Because the child was not
under sedation at the time of the tests, however, his movement adversely
affected the quality of the images, rendering them almost useless for the
diagnosis. The defendants then filed a motion requesting an order to
repeat the examination under sedation to generate a clearer image. The
trial court granted this request. When the plaintiff's parents failed to
produce the child for examination, the trial court found them in
contempt. Plaintiff then appealed.' 4
On appeal, the court weighed the risks of chloral hydrate sedation with
the benefits of a clear CT scan or MRI.' °5 The plaintiffs argued that the
risks should be weighed against the medical benefit to the child. The
court rejected that assertion, however, and stated that the risks were to be
weighed against the benefit to the case.'06
A medical ethics expert for the plaintiff had testified that the scan
would be unethical and improper because no medical benefit could be
101. See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 3 (1987)
(discussing approaches to conflicts between law and morality from the perspective of the
citizen and from the perspective of the jurist); see also Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389, 1391 (1992) (exploring tension
between the state's normative system of law and the legal profession's normative system
of ethics).
102. 566 N.E.2d 301 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
103. See id. at 302.
104. See id. at 302-06.
105. See id. at 308.
106. See id.
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derived from the procedure."°7 Even a minimal risk would have to be
weighed against the nonexistent medical benefits, in his view. The
ethics expert testified further that consent of either the patient or his
parents was ethically required. Since neither the parent nor the child had
consented, the procedure would not meet medical ethics standards even
if it were entirely risk-free.03
The court characterized the expert's affidavit as "meritless."' It
pointed out that illinois law specifically granted courts the power to
order physical exams as a legal discovery device, and that no law in
Illinois or elsewhere required courts making such orders to consider
whether the exam provided benefits for the plaintiff."0 Courts were
required only to determine whether the exam was relatively safe. The
expert's testimony about the ethical appropriateness of compelling a CT
scan was therefore beside the point, in the court's view. In the context
of legal discovery, neither consent to the scan nor risks and benefits
solely to the plaintiff could be dispositive."' After the defendants
showed that the potential risk of harm due to sedation was minimal, and
after the plaintiffs failed to show the child was particularly susceptible to
sedative-related risks or injury, the appellate court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded to the lower court."
2
b. Rogers v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health
A second case further illustrates that when bioethics testimony
conflicts with law, it is unhelpful to a court. Rogers v. South Carolina
Department of Mental Health"' was a 1989 appeal to the Court of
Appeals of South Carolina from a judgment in a wrongful death case."'
A woman with paranoid schizophrenia was being treated through the
South Carolina Department of Mental Health. She received inpatient
care, and subsequently, when she suffered a relapse, outpatient care.
The patient believed that her sister was trying to poison her; she




111. See id. at 308.
112. See id. at 309. On remand, the court's test order was to "be made more
specific as to the dosage, names of physicians, and safety measures employed in
performing the CT scan." Id.
113. 377 S.E.2d 125 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
114. See id. at 125.
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subsequently shot and killed another family member. The victim's
personal representative sued the Department, the Commissioner of
Mental Health, the Superintendent of the State Hospital, and two
physicians who treated the patient, alleging negligent failure to warn the
victim that the patient might harm her."5
A psychologist-ethics expert was to testify that the codes of ethics of
the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological
Association recognized a duty to warn if there is a reasonable probability
of risk to a named victim, and a warning could be given without
violating the patient's civil rights.'16 But, the trial judge refused to admit
the testimony. Because the plaintiff had offered no other expert
testimony to establish a breach of the professional standard of care, the
court granted the defendant a directed verdict."7 In explaining its
affirmation of the lower court's decision, the appellate court noted the
following:
Our disposition of the appeal makes it unnecessary to reach the appellant's
specific exceptions, since they are all based on the assumption that the doctors
were under a duty to warn [the victim]. In particular, we note that the
controversy over the admission of the psychologist's testimony is beside the
point, because the existence of a duty to warn is a question of law for the court,
not a matter of opinion testimony from witnesses." 8
The exclusion of the ethics testimony was affirmed in Rogers because
the question of whether there exists a duty to warn had already been
determined by law. When ethics and law conflict, the court implied,
bioethics testimony cannot be helpful to the court 9
In cases such as Sarka and Rogers, where bioethical standards directly
conflict with law, the expert testimony will not be helpful and should
ordinarily not be admitted."2 Judges should also avoid admitting
testimony even when it does not conflict with law, if it merely restates
115. See id.
116. See id. at 126.
117. See id. at 125.
118. Id. at 126-27.
119. Cf. McKnight v. Midwest Eye Inst., Inc., 799 S.W.2d 909, 917 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (bioethics testimony conflicts with contract).
120. This is not to suggest that when law and ethics or morality conflict, law should
always prevail; only that, in such cases, an expert ethics witness will probably not help
the court understand the facts or issues in the manner envisioned by Rule 702. See
Gunther Teubner, De Collisione Discursuum: Communicative Rationalities in Law,
Morality, and Politics, 17 CARozo L. REv. 901, 901-02 (1996) (describing "collision
rules" between law and other discourses); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 192-93 (1977) (arguing that when moral rights conflict with law, enforcing
the law would inflict an additional wrong); Alan H. Goldman, The Force of Precedent in
Legal, Moral, and Empirical Reasoning, 71 SYNmnSE 323, 323-29 (1987) (stating that
the force of precedent in legal reasoning is stronger than in moral or empirical reasoning,
but does not blindly bind judges to an amoral status quo).
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law. A restatement was part of the bioethics testimony in the following
case.
3. Conservatorship of Morrison v. Abramovice: Bioethics Testimony
Used to Supplement Persuasive Law when Novel State Issue
In Conservatorship of Morrison v. Abramovice, a conservator sought
injunctive relief against a California hospital and the attending physician
to remove a nasogastric tube from a patient who was in a persistent
vegetative state (PVS).'" The court faced two questions: did the
conservator have authority to request removal of the nasogastric (NG)
tube, and, if so, were physicians obligated to comply with the request.'
A bioethics ethics expert testified that a conservator was ethically
bound to seek medical advice, but not necessarily to follow it. That is,
the conservator could authorize removal of the NG tube over the
physician's objections. The ethics expert also testified that it was "[t]he
prevailing viewpoint among medical ethicists... that a physician has
the right to refuse on personal moral grounds to" comply with a
surrogate's choice, "but [that he or she] must [then] be willing to transfer
the patient."''
As to the first question, the court ruled the conservator could order
removal of the tube if the conservatee lacked the capacity to give
informed consent for medical treatment. 26  The conservator had
exclusive authority to give consent to the treatment or its removal as
long as consent was given in "good faith," based on medical advice.
The medical advice requirement did not, however, mandate that the
conservator adhere to the defendant physician's opinion about whether
to remove the tube or not." So long as the conservator had consulted
with physicians to obtain information regarding the patient's condition
and the prognosis for the conservatee was that he would not improve, the
conservator satisfied the medical advice requirement and could consent
in good faith."
121. 253 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1988).
122. See id. at 531-32.
123. See id. at 532, 534.
124. See id. at 533.
125. Id. at 534.
126. See id. at 531.
127. See id. at 533.
128. See id.
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The expert's testimony regarding authorizing removal of the NG tube
led the appellate court to a conclusion consistent with California law. In
particular, the Morrison court cited California's In re Drabick.'29
Drabick had held that the conservator of an incompetent person in a
vegetative state, with no hope of recovery, has the authority to decide,
considering medical advice and the conservatee's best interests, that a
NG tube should be withdrawn and the conservatee permitted a natural
death. 30 This part of the medical ethics testimony in Morrison,
therefore, merely reiterated California law and could have been excluded
on a number of grounds.'
Bioethics testimony can, however, be helpful to a court. John William
Strong has outlined several ways in which expert testimony may
theoretically be of assistance:
(1) supplying general propositions which will permit inferences from data
which the trier of fact would otherwise be forced to find meaningless; (2)
applying general propositions to data so as to generate inferences where the
complexity of the body of propositions applied, the difficulty of the application,
or other factors make the expert's conclusion probably more accurate or precise
than that of the trier of fact; (3) modifying, qualifying, and refining general
propositions which the trier of fact may reasonably be expected to use; and (4)
adding specialized confrmnation and, thus, confidence to general propositions
otherwise likely to be assumed more tentatively by the trier. 32
If bioethics testimony clarifies, refines, adds precision, or gives content
to health care standards that are consistent with the law, the testimony
may thereby be helpful to a court. In fact, medical ethics testimony on
the second issue in Morrison was helpful to the court.
33
Having determined that a conservator has the authority to request
129. See id.; Conservatorship of Drabick v. Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 (Ct.
App, 1988) (holding that conservator for incompetent person in vegetative state may
decide to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration).
130. See Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
131. Concerns about confusing law and ethics are frequently raised in the ethics
literature, but concerns about the cumulativeness of such testimony are not. See
Mishkin, supra note 3, at 51; Pellegrino & Sharpe, supra note 3, at 561. Rule 403 states,
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. For discussions of expert testimony
concerning law, see generally Thomas E. Baker, The Impropriety of Expert Witness
Testimony in the Law, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 325 (1992) (increasing use of expert
testimony on the law); Charles W. Ehrhardt, The Conflict Concerning Expert Witnesses
and Legal Conclusions, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 645 (1990) (outlining dangers of relaxed
admissibility requirements); Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARV. L. REV. 797
(1984) (stating that expert legal testimony should be judged by the same standards as
other expert testimony).
132. Strong, supra note 100, at 360.
133. See Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
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withdrawal of a nasogastric tube, the Morrison court faced a second
question: whether a conservator could require a physician to remove the
nasogastric tube against the physician's personal moral objections. This
issue was novel in California at the time.
The bioethics expert summarized for the court current medical ethics
standards regarding physicians' rights to conscientiously refuse to
participate in forgoing life sustaining treatment, and their concomitant
responsibility to assist in patient transfers." While the conclusion the
court drew was consistent with the bioethics expert's testimony, as it
was for the first question, the court's approach to expert testimony on
the second question, for which there was no binding law, was different.
In explaining its decision, the court referred first to the medical ethics
testimony.35 It then cited the work of a joint Los Angeles Bar and
Medical Association Committee, case law from outside the jurisdiction,
and language from the state's natural death act (which did not govern the
case).1
36
In Morrison, therefore, the expert apparently did not help the court
with the first question, since the issue had already been resolved by case
law.'37 But the bioethics testimony did contribute to resolving the second
question by "adding specialized confirmation... to... propositions
otherwise likely to be assumed more tentatively by the trier,"'38 in
Strong's terms. The conclusion that a physician may conscientiously
refuse to participate, but then must transfer a patient, could have been
reached on the basis of the recommendations of the Los Angeles Bar and
Medical Association Committee, case law from outside the jurisdiction,
or suggestive language in the state's natural death act, but the bioethics
testimony gave the judge a greater degree of certainty than if the other
sources had been the only ones relied upon. Though the testimony on
the second Morrison issue made only a modest contribution to the
court's reasoning, it was apparently helpful nonetheless.
134. See id. at 533.
135. See id. at 534.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 533.
138. Strong, supra note 100, at 360.
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4. McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman: Ethicist Testimony Can Be Used to
Determine Standard of Medical Care
McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman139 was a 1998 appeal from the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia."* In that case, the court described a
specific role that bioethics testimony may fill in aiding courts.
Appellants alleged that Walls-Kaufman, while serving as Mrs.
McCracken's chiropractor, sexually assaulted her on several occasions. 4'
Appellants' complaint asserted that these sexual assaults violated
applicable standards of care and ethical considerations as well as District
of Columbia law, "constituted acts of malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty, and/or negligence," and caused Mrs. McCracken to suffer
emotional distress which required in-patient and out-patient psychiatry
care.
4 2
The appellate court stated that the allegations of the complaint were
undoubtedly sufficient to state a cause of action for assault and battery.43
But the court also needed to determine whether appellants had stated a
claim for negligence. In order to determine the limits of a chiropractor's
duty to avoid sex with his patient, the court looked to common law
treatment of sex in analogous relationships: sex between physicians and
patients, sex between mental health professionals and clients or patients,
and sex between physicians and patients with a special relationship of
trust." ' The court held that if a medical professional not practicing in the
field of mental health enters into a relationship of trust and confidence
with a patient and takes on a counseling role similar to that of a
psychiatrist or psychologist, the professional should be bound by the
same standards as would bind a psychiatrist or psychologist in a similar
situation.'45
Mrs. McCracken was required to establish the applicable standard of
care through expert testimony. 46 This testimony could, in the court's
opinion, be supplied by an ethicist, if necessary. The court stated,
It may be appropriate and necessary to rely upon the testimony of an expert
medical ethicist or other expert, who can testify as to existing standards of care
that are followed with respect to practitioners in fields other than mental health,
who become engaged in giving counsel or advice to patients similar to that
139. 717 A.2d 346 (D.C. 1998).




144. See id. at 351-52.
145. See id. at 352.
146. See id.
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usually given by psychologists or [psychiatrists]. 147
Therefore, in regard to the McCracken issue as well as the second
Morrison issue, judges viewed bioethics testimony as a potential aid to
understanding the applicable standards of conduct for relationships
between health care providers and patients. In Morrison, the expert
added incrementally to the court's understanding; in McCracken, the
court suggested that an ethicist could substitute for a health professional
in supplying information about the relevant ethical standard. These
functions fit squarely within Rule 702 notions of helpfulness.
B. Future Challenges: Relation Between Testimony and Relevant Law
Although expert bioethics testimony is too new to define with
precision the circumstances in which it will and will not be helpful to
courts, two kinds of bioethics testimony should clearly be suspect on
grounds of unhelpfulness. Testimony directly conflicting with binding
law in the jurisdiction or merely restating it is unlikely to meet the Rule
702 standard of aiding the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
determine a fact in issue. Thus, such testimony should ordinarily not be
admitted. Other expert bioethics testimony should not automatically be
admitted, but should be further scrutinized for helpfulness.
147. Id. at 353. Ethics testimony was used in a similar way in Mazza v. Huffaker,
300 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). Mazza was a 1983 appeal from a malpractice
judgment against a North Carolina psychiatrist. See id at 833. While Mr. Mazza was
his patient, Dr. Huffaker had sexual relations with Mr. Mazza's wife. The lower court
found the psychiatrist liable. One of the issues for the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina was whether the trial judge had made an error in permitting expert witnesses to
testify that professional ethics required psychiatrists to refrain from having sexual
relations with their patients' spouses. See id. at 841. Dr. Huffaker's claim was that
permitting the expert testimony allowed the jury to impose legal liability for what was
actually a breach of professional ethics. See id. The appellate court determined that
admission of the bioethics testimony was not in error. The ethics experts could give
content to the accepted standards of care by referring to the ethical standards of the
profession, according to the court, at least when the accepted standards of care were
coterminous with the relevant standards of professional ethics, as several experts had
testified they were. See id.
148. Deriving "ought" from "is" is often considered a mistake in philosophy. See
Searle, supra note 87, at 43. But this is roughly what is required in legal determinations
of professional standards of care. An expert must testify to the standard of care to which
the defendant is expected to have conformed, if he or she is to avoid being found
negligent. Implicit in the process is that one should "do one's duty."
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V. CONCLUSION
Three guidelines discussed above will help ensure that bioethics
testimony meets Rule 702 standards. When scrutinizing bioethics
experts, courts will first need to bear in mind that bioethics is an
interdisciplinary and increasingly specialized field. In order to avoid the
problem of generalization of expertise, they should ask whether the
proffered expert has done work that is related to the particular issue
about which the expert will testify.
Second, in light of Kumho Tire, courts should be wary of
recommendations to exclude ethics testimony simply because the
testimony is normative. Relying categorically on a strict separation of
normative, descriptive, and metaethical testimony is inconsistent with
the Kumho Tire Court's insistence on case-by-case criteria for reliability.
Courts should instead focus on indicators of reliability that have some
currency in the field, such as general acceptance and peer review.
Courts should insist, in addition, on a clear link between the expert's
method and the facts of the case.
Finally, judges should recognize that in specific cases, law and ethics
may be synonymous, distinct, at odds, complementary, or overlapping.'49
Bioethics testimony that directly conflicts with law ordinarily cannot be
helpful to a court, at least not in the sense that Rule 702 envisions. The
threshold question in the helpfulness inquiry, therefore, should be
whether the bioethics testimony is related to relevant law. Only after the
bioethics testimony has been determined to be neither in conflict with
the law nor a mere restatement of it should the court proceed to
determine whether it will be helpful.
The field of bioethics has achieved a remarkable degree of public
recognition in a relatively short period of time. Given the complexity of
medical technology and the health care delivery system, and the speed of
change in both, it is likely that courts will continue to look to bioethics
experts for help with difficult questions.'5" The three guidelines
discussed above should help clarify what is needed to meet Rule 702
standards and to ensure that, despite potential problems with
qualification, reliability, and helpfulness, the presence of bioethics
149. See generally MARSHALL B. KAPP, OuR HANDS ARE TIED: LEGAL TENSIONS
AND MEDICAL ETmics (1998) (declaring that unethical medical practices are frequently
based on physicians' reactions to, and misperceptions of, the law).
150. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 50 (predicting that the Human Genome Project
will spawn many disputes in which litigants may attempt to introduce expert bioethics
testimony); see also E. Haavi Morreim, Bioethics, Expertise, and the Courts: An
Overview and an Argument for Inevitability, 22 J. MED. & PriM. 291, 294-95 (1997)
(arguing that moral values cannot be excluded from legal decisions, and that people
trained in bioethics may enrich the proceedings).
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experts in the courtroom will augment rather than thwart the legal
process.
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